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Like the category of obscenity in art, neo-liberalism seems to obey a maxim that 
ensures its regular circulation within university folklore: we know it when we see it. 
We know something neo-liberal is happening when generous colleagues fail to have 
their contracts renewed because they do not meet obscure metrics for research 
performance derived from Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). We know neo-
liberalism has taken hold when, rather than pursuing their interests or talents, 
students make course choices based on perceived benefits for future employment 
incomes to repay higher tuition fees resulting from sector-wide marketization and 
deregulation. We know that we belong to neo-liberal institutions when the carefully 
formed languages of specialist disciplines are replaced by the languages of 
management, such that a research project acquires value only through its outputs, 
its impacts, its scalability, its ‘innovations’, or its potential to produce further 
growth. And yet, we do not always know what a unifying concept such as ‘neo-
liberalism’ adds to all of this knowing. 
 
Many contemporary commentaries on neo-liberalism could be classified as what 
Eve Sedgwick, following Silvan Tomkins, calls ‘strong theories’. Strong theories 
claim to be ‘capable of accounting for a wide spectrum of phenomena which appear 
to be very remote, one from the other, and from a common source’ (Tomkins, 
quoted in Sedgwick, 2003, p. 134). For example, Marxist political economists have 
been accused of being overly ‘functionalist’ in their accounts of neo-liberalism, by 
attributing multiple transformations to a single causal factor – the struggle between 
capital and labour (Flew, 2014, p. 58). Calling Marxism a ‘strong theory’ does not 
mean saying that it is false, only that its most common articulations involve moving 
from an unstable multiplicity of effects to a more stable continuity of causes. But 
cultural accounts of neo-liberalism can also contain similarly ‘strong’ impulses. For 
example, competitive reality television programmes or self-help books have been 
described as neo-liberal because they participate in the common logic of individual 
self-determination, even if competitive games and popular psychology have 
entirely different cultural origins. Elsewhere, neo-liberalism has been identified in 
the ideology of ‘linear time’ subtending European colonialism, thereby linking the 
critique of neo-liberalism to a strong theory of global- and post-coloniality 
(Shahjahan, 2015, p. 491). These strong theories present contrasting narratives 
about the historical duration and geographical scope of neo-liberalism, but they do 
share a commitment to distinguishing between neo-liberalism as a unitary cause 
and social interactions as derivative effects. This raises the following questions: 
when we use neo-liberal as a modifier – neo-liberal society, neo-liberal university, 
neo-liberal subject – do we mean that these phenomena would not exist without 





This article argues that the strong theorization of neo-liberalism does not provide 
an adequate frame for understanding the local circumstances attending one of its 
most recognizable components: measurement. We do so by examining 
contemporary pressures on, and techniques employed in, higher degree research 
(HDR) programmes. It is an educational truism that the most exciting learning 
experiences are hard to measure, and that the experience of being measured is 
hardly exciting. The experience of completing a PhD dissertation brings this issue 
into sharp relief, as graduates frequently encounter a mismatch between the 
intellectual and emotional work required to complete a thesis, and the 
performance indicators used to sort applicants for academic positions, which may 
only have a tangential relationship to the substantive achievements of the thesis. 
But singular learning experiences are difficult to incorporate into staff meetings, 
curriculum reviews or institution-wide policy initiatives. Measurement can 
therefore arrive as a way of ‘getting things done’ in finite decision-making 
environments, even when this involves drawing upon impoverished 
representations of lived experiences. Rather than understanding measurement 
practices according to the criteria of naturalism that would seek to represent the 
world ‘as it is’, we understand such practices as material signs with varying degrees 
of embeddedness in social and institutional worlds. In this context, the article 
argues that many critiques of neo-liberalism do not sufficiently advance alternative 
ways to think about the purposes of higher education, and that correspondingly, 
‘neo-liberalization’ does not exhaustively explain the issues attending increased 
measurement and surveillance practices in HDR environments. We therefore want 
to focus on the worlds that measurements bring into being, and on the criticisms 
made of these worlds in contemporary sociological research on higher education. 
 
Measurement is examined here from three distinct viewpoints. Firstly, we revisit 
contemporary studies of the neo-liberal university, and consider the high premium 
placed on measurement as the privileged technology of institutional progress. The 
article suggests that metrics often become mobile sites of powerful collective 
investment, and that even those sceptical about the purposes of metrics can come 
to care about and desire certain numbers. Secondly, we focus on specific concerns 
raised around measurement regarding HDR. Postgraduate environments are 
considered by many to be the final bastions of passionate intellectual inquiry 
protected from the continuous measurements that attend most undergraduate 
programmes. The incremental reframing of doctoral study in Australian universities 
as an outcomes-driven pursuit places heightened pressure on educators to clearly 
identify those features of long-term research projects that may have immeasurable 
outputs. Finally, as a gesture towards imagining alternative ways of thinking about 
learning outcomes, the article argues that pedagogical environments need to find 
ways to make HDR ‘failures’ – non-submissions, abandoned projects, flawed ideas 
– institutionally worthwhile and intellectually generative. It may be that 
measurement cultures are best inhabited by learning how to fail well. 
 
Measurement and higher education 
The relationship between quality and quantity has widespread significance for 
organizations interested in measuring ‘quality’ practices and objects (see Anderson, 
2006). In simple terms, qualities are properties that allow one thing to be 
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distinguished from another thing. For example, blue is a quality that can be 
distinguished from red. Some qualities have direct quantitative correlates (blue has 
a wavelength of 450–495 nanometres), but many concepts describe non-
quantifiable qualities. For example, the musical notion of ‘timbre’ has been used to 
describe composite variables, where no single quantity – amplitude, pitch, 
resonance – is completely essential to the concept. By contrast, quantification 
presupposes exactness in the units quantified, and there is no quantity that does 
not require a fixed separation between qualities. However, numerical 
measurements can easily become unmoored from the experiential world of 
qualitative differences, producing differential numbers with no sensible referent. 
For example, the birth rate in Australia in 2012 was 1.93 children per Australian 
female, and although qualities are required to distinguish one birth from another, 
one cannot imagine 1.93 children. Furthermore, a changing annual birth rate may 
be detectable only across a large-scale population, and a national shift from 2.03 to 
1.93 may go unnoticed within any particular community. Used in this way, 
measurement practices may risk alienating or disempowering those to whom they 
are applied, either because the objects being measured cease to be tangible in 
everyday experience (1.93 children), or because metrics may suffer from scaling 
effects, where extremely broad trends contain little explanatory power at a local 
level (2.03 to 1.93). The development of proxy indicators and probabilistic 
inferences (see Shachter, 1988) to measure large groups – students, workers, 
voters – can often produce measurements more useful for the governance of a 
population than for assisting the practices or improving the well-being of any 
particular individual within that population.  
 
This opens onto the issue of the organizational structures that coordinate 
measurement practices. Within institutional settings, disagreements about the 
purposes, frequency and effects of measurement can reflect structural conflicts 
between various stakeholders in the production of quantitative data. Measurement 
practices simultaneously reflect and modify relationships between those who 
measure and those who are measured. In a variation of commodity fetishism, the 
aura of objectivity acquired by measurement practices can mask the social power 
relations between managers and the managed. This may also mean that key metrics 
come to be defined not by their utility to individual practitioners, but by their 
capacity to travel upwardly through an organizational administration. Numbers 
begin signifying more easily as reliable ‘proof’ once they circulate beyond an 
original ‘circle of belief’ – that is, those who actually produced the numbers (Kamuf, 
2007, p. 257). Issues of this kind are regularly raised regarding the measurement of 
‘learning’ and ‘research’ in the Australian tertiary sector, and such measurements 
have particular impacts on HDR students. We can only offer a sample here of the 
measurement practices that attend HDR programmes in Australian universities, but 
they are broadly indicative of wider trends. 
 
Firstly, students are evaluated for entry into research programmes and eligibility 
for scholarships. For example, RMIT University’s ‘Model to determine merit-based 
selection’ establishes a candidate’s score based on their highest qualification (up to 
55 percentage points), a school allocated score (up to 15), and either a combination 
of recent degree (20) and publications (10) or publications (10) and relevant 
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professional experience (20) (RMIT, 2011, p. 1). In this formula, a Master’s degree 
by research is equivalent to 20 years’ relevant professional experience, and a 
refereed article in a scholarly journal is equivalent to an original creative work of 
international significance. Once enrolled, doctoral candidates are measured at 
regular intervals within their candidacy, often through discrete and ordinal 
indicators such as satisfactory, less than satisfactory, unsatisfactory. Although many 
doctoral candidates will not be able to pursue stable academic careers (see 
Mayhew, 2014), many will learn to recognize the KPIs used to measure academic 
performance, especially those that could shape future employment opportunities: 
publication outputs and the H-Index, student evaluation scores, ‘impact’ scores and 
so on. For the measurement of cohorts or populations, university administrations 
frequently mobilize recruitment rates, completion rates and post-doctoral 
employment rates. Differentiated metrics produce a logic of continuous 
improvement, where strong performance is not measured according to a fixed 
standard (60–70, 70–80), but is oriented instead towards infinite growth and 
expansion (e.g., 2% per annum). Finally, any metric whatsoever can be subsumed 
within a system of ordinal measurements, or rankings. Ordinal rankings for 
programmes, institutions, journals and publishers can have a significant impact on 
what Guy Roberts-Holmes (2015) calls ‘data chains’, with institutions modifying 
postgraduate recruitment practices to improve the rank attached to programmes, 
faculties or entire universities, and to reduce any penalties attached to HDR 
candidates who fail to complete (this is relevant for the distribution of Australian 
Postgraduate Award scholarships). Unlike interval variables, ordinal variables do 
not require any specification of the gap between each placement, such that trivial 
differences between individuals can acquire a heightened sense of symbolic 
meaning (see Bowman & Bastedo, 2011, p. 441). Tacit logics of ranking may also 
shape the interpretation of data intended to be criteria-based. For example, the 
Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) framework claims to evaluate 
programmes ‘against national and international benchmarks’, but the resulting 
numbers frequently circulate among potential postgraduate students as proxies for 
‘best’ or ‘worst’ programme (on the ERA, see Redden, 2008).  
 
Sociologists of higher education have amply shown that measurement practices 
across universities worldwide can produce distorted understandings of teaching, 
learning or research.1 We want to focus less on criticisms concerned with true or 
false representations, and consider instead how measurement practices actively 
modify the worlds they seek to measure (see Burrows, 2012; Redden, 2015). As 
studies of standardized testing have shown, learning environments cannot be 
subject to continual measurement without bringing into being new professional 
practices and anxieties responsive to metric cultures (see Redden & Low, 2012). In 
some contexts, metrics used to determine teaching performance or research 
quality may even come to be treated as compliance-based games abstracted from 
pedagogical or intellectual purposes (see Anderson, 2006, p. 171). For this reason, 
in order to better understand forms of continuity and change in conceptions of 
HDR, the following section examines the overlapping critiques levelled at 
                                                            




measurement under the concept of neo-liberalism. In the final section of this 
article, we link various effects of the forms of measurement that attend 
contemporary PhD programmes in Australia.  
 
Four critiques of neo-liberalism in the university 
Contemporary scholarship on measurement in higher education has been 
profoundly shaped by the concept of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ball, 2015; Gill, 2016; 
Redden, 2015). According to David Harvey’s influential approach, neo-liberalism 
holds that ‘the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and 
frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the 
domain of the market’ (2007, p. 3). Harvey acknowledges that neo-liberal economic 
practices have developed ‘unevenly’ across the globe, and that state-sponsored 
neo-liberal policies have been ‘partial’, ‘lopsided’ and ‘tentative’ (p. 13). 
Nevertheless, despite the highly disparate phenomena now labelled as neo-liberal, 
Harvey suggests that the emergence of neo-liberal thought can be attributed to a 
broad historical situation: the crises of over-production in industrial and post-
industrial economies that culminated in the early 1970s (pp. 11–14). This politico-
economic explanation has faced numerous challenges, and Terry Flew (2014) notes 
that at least six distinct theories of neo-liberalism now circulate in sociology and 
economics. Among these, Michel Foucault’s lectures on neo-liberal techniques of 
government have become highly influential. Across his broad oeuvre, Foucault 
traces the development of state-based institutions – schools, hospitals, psychiatric 
wards, the police force – that bring forth subjective dispositions through direct 
intervention into everyday habits, routines, desires, anxieties and so on (see 
Donzelot, 2008; Foucault, 2008). Rather than describing a re-articulation between 
capital and labour, Foucault’s account of neo-liberalism focuses on its ethical 
prescriptions and epistemological presuppositions, including neo-liberal 
reconceptions of human behaviour, interest and justice. While Marxists and 
Foucauldians share an understanding that neo-liberalism seeks to marketize all 
manner of social relationships, the former tend to emphasize the erosion of 
collectivized labour rights and working conditions, while the latter take a greater 
interest in new forms of selfhood and ethical conduct that cut across class positions 
and socio-economic hierarchies. Such differences are reflected in the spectrum of 
criticisms weighed against neo-liberalism in higher education, which can be divided 
into four broad themes: commensuration, incentivization, corporatization and 
alienation. We will consider these criticisms in turn, before returning to the broader 
questions raised around metrics and HDR. 
 
Firstly, there is a critique of commensuration, or the subsumption of diverse 
activities within a single quantitative calculation. Roger Burrows suggests that 
academic use-values were once properly distinguished from other value systems, 
such as aesthetic and commercial values, and that this distinction dissolved with 
the ‘metricization’ of the academy, which has ‘flattened’ culture through ‘economic 
imperatives’ (2012, p. 355). One example is the H-Index for academic citations, 
which combines ‘the number of papers – as an aspect of quantity – and citations – 
as a supposed aspect of quality, into a single number’ (p. 361). The H-Index as a 
proxy indicator for research ‘quality’ or disciplinary ‘impact’ allows universities to 
compare publications from diverse disciplines as if they each contribute to a solid 
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mass of something called knowledge. Structural analysis of the H-Index algorithm 
shows that it tacitly rewards publishing quantity over quality, partially as a result of 
its failure to signal the diversity of ways that intellectual labour can produce 
institutional or disciplinary value (see Costas & Bordons, 2007).  
 
Secondly, scholars have criticized incentivizing metrics, or those intended to 
promote workplace competition and constant self-improvement (Ball, 2015). From 
a Foucauldian perspective, neo-liberal governance through metrics requires 
remoulding subjects as competitive individuals, and therefore builds on cultural 
myths of self-determination and autonomy (see Stevenson, 2010). Rosalind Gill 
describes the calculative, neo-liberal university as ‘an overheated competitive 
atmosphere in which acts of kindness, generosity and solidarity often seem to 
continue only in spite of, rather than because of, the governance of universities’ 
(2016, pp. 46–47). While many new metrics are advertised as reflexive resources 
for monitoring and improving individual performances, competitive workplace 
environments inevitably position KPIs within a comparative frame: another’s 
success becomes a possible sign of one’s own failure. In the context of HDR 
programmes, fine grained differences between students can acquire a cumulative 
institutional force. For any given individual, slight under-performance relative to a 
cohort can mean decreased eligibility for awards, scholarships, teaching 
opportunities and so on.  
 
Thirdly, scholars have criticized the corporatization of universities as a response to 
funding shortfalls in neo-liberal climes. Henry Giroux (2011) argues for the 
continuing need for universities to serve democratic interests within a nation as a 
whole, and has criticized efforts to price the value of education in micro-economic 
terms. The response from some institutions has been to make some pricing 
mechanisms more expansive – say, by including outputs not captured by 
conventional metrics, such as public impact and engagement. But for humanities 
programmes, some scholars have advanced broader arguments for the value 
contained in producing the ‘personnel necessary for maintaining certain cultural 
and ethical levels in the population at large’ (Hunter, 1989, p. 446). From this 
perspective, HDR programmes should not be evaluated through post-graduation 
employment rates or per capita research outputs, but through a more holistic 
analysis of the wider social benefits gained from the maintenance of collective 
understanding around culture, ethics, social conduct and so on. As Ian Hunter has 
argued, there are risks in romanticizing disinterested learning, rather than 
identifying specific spheres – policy development, secondary education, public 
health – to which humanities graduates may make significant contributions (pp. 
446–447). Nevertheless, the marketization of higher education does frequently 
punish those programmes that cannot point towards tangible vocational outcomes, 
and in Marxist terms, prioritizes the interests of capital investment over the quality 
of living for those who labour. 
 
Finally, technologies of quantification have been criticized for their alienating 
effects. The experience of being measured can produce stress, exhaustion and 
frustration, even when no direct penalty is attached to outcomes (see Thompson 
& Harbaugh, 2013). Metric cultures alienate academics from their own intellectual 
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labour by producing an ‘endlessly self-monitoring, planning, prioritising 
“responsibilised” subject’ (Gill & Pratt, 2008, p. 4). Stephen Ball (2015, p. 259) 
describes ‘neoliberal affects’ in terms of ‘ontological insecurity’ involving ‘both a 
loss of a sense of meaning in what we do and of what is important in what we do’. 
Measurement practices can also transform social relationships within institutions, 
insofar as metrics come to function as impersonal and bureaucratic technologies. 
Burrows (2012, p. 363) argues that a regime of trust has shifted to a regime of 
accountability, and describes favourably an earlier era where ‘collegiate discussion, 
the occasional argument and a few rough calculations by someone in authority was 
normally all that was involved in working out “who did what”’. The neo-
liberalization of the academy shifts agency away from communities of practitioners 
towards professional managers, often working at some considerable distance from 
classroom spaces or research projects. Sarah Ahmed (2012, p. 117) argues that the 
managerial goal of achieving measurable diversity ‘outputs’ can often supersede 
any consideration of the hierarchical social structures that keep racism, sexism and 
other forms of exclusion in place. Numbers can therefore come to ‘stand in’ or 
substitute for the absence of concrete social and political transformations. 
 
These four critiques foreground social values and relationships within universities 
that cannot easily be measured, and that may be threatened by metric cultures. 
Commensuration threatens the singularity of ideas and disciplines; competitive 
incentivization threatens workplace solidarity; corporatization threatens the social 
benefits attending humanities education; and metric cultures alienate individuals 
from their own intellectual labour and from institutional decision-making. In each 
instance, ‘strong theories’ of neo-liberalism have indicted metricization as a harm 
to be eradicated, and in several of the works considered so far – most notably, Gill 
(2016), Burrows (2012) and Giroux (2011) – neo-liberalism becomes the primary 
battle-ground over which a range of institutional skirmishes take place. For scholars 
interested in doctoral education, the corresponding question could become: how 
can we defend the PhD from neo-liberalism, or from neo-liberal techniques of 
measurement? 
 
We are broadly sympathetic to the critiques of commensuration, incentivization, 
corporatization and alienation. However, these critiques raise a central sociological 
problem: critiques of neo-liberalism in higher education are largely devoid of neo-
liberals. Neo-liberalism is understood as something that happens to people in 
institutions rather than something that happens through people in institutions. As 
indicated above, this tension may be partially reconciled by accounts of ‘subject 
formation’, wherein institutional forces are understood to compose individual 
dispositions through particular ways of being and doing (see Foucault, 1977). 
Universities are not necessarily overpopulated by individuals committed to neo-
liberalism (‘neo-liberals’), but they do mould individual habits and orientations to 
be more compliant with the marketized turbulences of academic life. However, 
while certain situations bring forth dispositions that conform to an economic 
rationality, this only happens to a certain degree. Strong theories of neo-liberalism 
need to be coupled with what Sedgwick – again, following Tomkins – calls ‘weak’ 
theories (2003, pp. 134–135). Strong theories begin with a universalizing ideology 
that is then addressed according to its own universalizing register: in all times and 
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all places, is neoliberalism good or bad? By contrast, a weak theory rejects 
universals and compiles its account of neo-liberalism by way of disparate and 
heterogeneous practices. These practices may have been captured by institutions 
shaped by neo-liberalism, but they do not necessarily originate with them. Weak 
theories might distinguish between measurement as an effect of latent causes 
(neo-liberalism, capitalism, corporatization), and measurement as a practice that 
enters into the life-worlds of those charged with measuring others, even as they 
themselves are measured. 
 
To understand neo-liberal measurement from the viewpoint of practices, we want 
to distinguish between what Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1996) calls ‘passive 
affects’ and ‘active affects’. Institutional practices imposed from the outside can be 
experienced as passive affects, because we are affected by them without having 
any recourse to affect these practices in turn. The experience of being measured 
through KPIs, for example, makes the individual passive in relation to the metrics 
used. For Spinoza, passive affects may be transformed into active affects when the 
self is experienced as a cause. Critiques of neo-liberalism focus on the passive 
affects of being measured, and promote forms of resistance that may be 
understood as active critique. In this way, the agency of individuals in neo-liberal 
settings is defined in positive, humanistic terms – the individual seeks to protect 
personal values and well-being against neo-liberal incursions. However, for neo-
liberal metrics to become effective, individuals must be sensitized to market (or 
market-like) signals (see Foucault, 2008, p. 269). In their capacities as tutors, 
coordinators and higher degree supervisors, academics are entrusted with the task 
of sensitizing others to various grades, quantities and rankings. Individuals’ latent 
capacities to measure, evaluate, judge, advocate, deliberate and critique are 
constantly mobilized by techniques of neo-liberal government. As a research 
supervisor, the academic conveys ideas about appropriate rates of progress, 
journal rankings, the relative merits of various projects and so on. The experience 
of being measured implicitly involves training to become one who measures and 
who can train others to be measured. Certain scholars may even regard themselves 
with disdain as active causes of neo-liberal affects. Academics do not critique neo-
liberalism from an external vantage point, but rather from the situation of one 
whose competencies actively contribute to the markets they may seek to resist. 
This situation conforms to aspects of Marx’s conception of alienation from the 
commodity form. Academic researchers as individuals contribute to a world of 
objects that disempower academics as a collective, insofar as present benchmarks 
for research performance are based on the ‘dead’ labour of past research (see 
Marx, 1974, pp. 61–63). But the situation also has immediately social and subjective 
elements. In HDR spaces, academics are charged with teaching others to inhabit 
the neo-liberal academy and its metric cultures. Furthermore, such obligations may 
even be met with enthusiasm. Pressures to conform to metric cultures may feel 
compelling because individuals are already compelled by other commitments. 
These may involve a love of reading and writing, a sense of fulfilment in the 
classroom, a pleasure in mentoring future academics, a desire for social status or 
simply the habitual comforts of working in a familiar and supportive social 
environment. Here, we follow John Clarke’s argument that ‘[whether] we treat neo-
liberalism from the standpoint of capitalist regimes of accumulation, or as a version 
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of liberal governmentality, most of its political work involves practices of de- and 
re-articulation: reorganizing principles, policies, practices, and discourses into new 
configurations, assemblages, or constellations.’ (2008, pp. 138–139) The desire to 
participate in university life and to have stable employment is not exclusively a neo-
liberal one, but such desires can be re-articulated within a neo-liberal context. 
What Spinoza might call the ‘joyful’ affects of being an academic are intermingled 
with, rather than merely opposed to, the various measurements that shape 
everyday institutional labour. 
 
In the following section, we focus directly on HDR in Australian universities. HDR, 
and in particular the PhD, provides an important interface between two polarized 
tendencies within contemporary higher education: the collective desire to develop 
original research that furthers disciplinary knowledge, and the pressure to produce 
measurable outputs that make HDR programmes sustainable within a neo-liberal 
organizational context. 
 
HDR in Australian universities 
Massification, marketization and internationalization have underpinned significant 
changes in Western universities since the Second World War, and in Australia, 
significantly intensified in the 1980s (Barcan, 2013, p. 6). In 1980, 330,000 students 
were enrolled in Australian higher education, increasing to 1,221,008 by 2011 
(Barcan, 2013, p. 32). The Group of Eight (2013) reported in 2013 that between 
2000 and 2010, doctoral enrolments at Australian universities grew from 27,966 to 
47,066 (68%), and PhD completions increased from 3793 to 6053 per year. For Ruth 
Barcan, ‘The creation of a large and variegated [Post-War tertiary] sector…put in 
place all the elements required for a more prominent role for the market: diversity, 
competition and an emphasis on consumer rights’ (2013, p. 39). The demand that 
universities be accountable for public funding has intensified pressures on HDR 
Masters and doctoral completions, which are now understood primarily as 
institutional ‘outputs’. Students are increasingly held accountable for timely 
completion through regular reporting, review panels, work-in-progress seminars 
and informal contracts. Correspondingly, the tendency towards what Pam Green 
and Robin Usher (2003, p. 44) call ‘fast’ supervision is formalized through 
mandatory training modules and university registers, with a focus on the frequency 
of meetings, length of time for feedback on work, and progress planning and annual 
reviews. Christine Halse and Peter Bansel characterize the outcomes-oriented 
model of supervision as ‘reductive’ because it ‘construes doctoral students, 
supervisors, and supervision as [simply] an aggregation of identifiable, universal 
factors that can be reduced to quantifiable metrics’ (Halse & Bansel, 2012, p. 381). 
There may be three distinct benefits to embedded measurement practices within 
HDR candidatures.  
 
Firstly, they can help to overcome the still widespread discourse on intelligence and 
giftedness. When one speaks of a ‘good’ project, one simply refers to the potential 
for ‘good’ future outcomes for the student. This pragmatic attitude places 
accreditation hurdles within their proper institutional context, rather than allowing 
PhD and Master’s projects to become inflated symbols for intellectual genius. 
Secondly, metrics in HDR spaces can provide important forms of leverage when 
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seeking to secure better provisions around research training and student support 
(Halse & Bansel, 2012, p. 381). With a touch of irony, the measurement of learning 
spaces can be identified both with increasing pressures on performance and 
outputs, and with the development of more holistic measurements for students’ 
experiences of anxiety, depression and so on. Thirdly, rates of non-completion are 
significantly reduced through continuous measurement, which is often used to 
identify ‘at risk’ projects. The event of submission is stretched backwards across the 
entire candidature, so that for the contemporary HDR candidate, preparedness to 
submit becomes an active variable from the first day of enrolment. 
Correspondingly, students become sensitized to a range of positive and negative 
indicators about their activities, from coursework to annual reviews, to peer 
reviews and teaching evaluations, to publication track records and the H-Index. In 
this context, an ‘at risk’ student becomes one less sensitized to institutional 
indicators than their peers, or who is receiving indicators from a narrower range of 
sources. 
 
However, describing measurement in this way atomizes the individual, and 
obscures the social processes that endow institutional signs with social meanings. 
Postgraduate enculturation, like academic communities in general, is organized by 
gossip, as a source of useful information, as a means of consolidating social 
relationships and as tacit training in the verification of competing truth-claims 
(Grealy, 2016; Grealy & Laurie, in press). PhD candidates will gossip about 
measurements ranging from progress and annual reviews, journal article 
acceptances and rejections, views on an online profile, appropriate numbers of 
publications or teaching appointments on an academic CV, and the ranking of 
institutions. Such conversations are one means by which students and their 
supervisors come to learn which metrics have serious consequences, and which 
merely operate as organizational shorthands, even if constantly called into question 
or debunked. The metrics that matter are also likely to change across the course of 
a student’s candidature, from revised disciplinary definitions of ‘research 
excellence’ to national funding changes, such as the Australian federal 
government’s proposal that university funding be partially delinked from research 
output (see Department of Education and Training, 2016). In this context, future 
research on measurement in HDR programmes might consider the social worlds 
developed by students in relation to institutional expectations. For the remainder 
of this discussion, however, we want to consider some of the issues raised by 
measurement in relation to doctoral education tout court. The proliferation of 
measurement practices within doctoral programmes has met with resistance. 
Andrew Riemer is often quoted for recollections of an era when academics 
regarded students with disdain, and where interventionist supervision ‘would have 
seemed a breach of good manners – or intolerable intrusion’ (quoted in Cribb & 
Gewirtz, 2006, p. 225; see also Barcan, 2013, p. 14). Such nostalgic criticisms can 
be countered by examples of students who suffer from a lack of institutional 
support or coherent professionalization, and who become isolated and discontinue 
their study. This is not about framing students as ‘consumers’, but about 
recognizing inherent organizational flaws to any trust-based regime. More 
compelling criticisms can be made of the unanticipated impacts of measurement 
practices on research cultures. We noted above that in selection processes for HDR 
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candidates in Australian universities, it is assumed that students will have already 
produced signals of excellence through performance in undergraduate and 
Honours programmes. This early screening of students may produce unexpected 
harms. A survey of scientists in Britain’s Royal Society, for example, showed that 46 
per cent had not received a ‘first’ as undergraduates (see Grove, 2016). There may 
be potentially adverse effects of removing from the postgraduate pool students 
who have not reached ‘peak’ performance as undergraduates. Furthermore, once 
a HDR programme has commenced, continuous measurement may reward projects 
that produce immediate results in order to satisfy institutional hurdles in early 
candidature. Whether enforced directly by a supervisor, or indirectly normalized 
through a wider institutional environment, highly measured environments provide 
incentives towards conservatism in topics and research design.  
 
These issues are not unique to doctoral programmes, and many have already been 
raised by the four critiques of neo-liberalism surveyed above. Nevertheless, 
doctoral research projects do have singular qualities. Singularities cannot be broken 
into smaller component pieces without fundamentally changing their character. 
For example, the three-year Doctor of Philosophy is not a research activity that 
merely combines six semesters into a single accreditation hurdle. For many 
students, the desire to complete a PhD, and to adopt an identity as a PhD student, 
is not experienced merely as an aggregate of networks and outputs. Candidates 
recognize an important and profound difference between completing and not 
completing, and this difference is never equivalent to the ‘amount’ learnt. The 
doctorate therefore has a special kind of temporality, or what French philosopher 
Henri Bergson might call a singular duration (1920, p. 238). Many of the benefits 
frequently linked to PhD candidature require a minimal passing of time: disciplinary 
mastery, professional know-how, experience as a teacher, the building of social and 
institutional relationships and so on. Doctoral candidates are therefore not 
encouraged to shop around for supervisors from semester to semester, and a 
certain modicum of instability and confusion is still tolerated in doctoral 
programmes for much longer than most other tertiary programmes. Most 
importantly, the extended duration of doctoral education provides a space for 
failure. For some students, the traces of learning are strewn across a series of 
disappointments, misfirings and desertions. As queer theorist J. Jack Halberstam 
(2011) notes, the most ambitious and transformative collective projects may be 
experienced by individual agents as failures. Hazardous leaps towards genuinely 
new research may easily be disregarded as simply bad research, even by 
researchers themselves. Over time, failures may be recuperated as germinal 
moments in successful intellectual or political endeavours, but this ‘over time’ 
provides no guarantees. Society does not transform itself by realizing the goals that 
it sets for itself, but by creating spaces where new goals can emerge, however much 
they might violate existing utilitarian calculations. Failing and abandoned research 
projects can do important transformative work in testing the capacities and limits 
of a discipline. However, recognizing the productive dimensions of failure should 
not amount to a reckless disregard of pastoral care. Intellectual and professional 
failure can be highly damaging to students, and the well-being of PhD candidates is 
certainly linked to the personal perception of producing ‘successful’, ‘valuable’ and 
‘important’ work. But these terms acquire an entirely different meaning – and, we 
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want to suggest, a much less desirable meaning – in learning environments where 
failure is perceived in purely negative terms. A doctoral candidate should be able 
to make decisions in a context where failure is understood to be a productive part 
of disciplinary growth, and not a sign of intellectual weakness. 
 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to write about the immeasurable worth of education without a certain 
degree of implicit elitism. The presence of instrumentalization, professionalization 
and fiscal accountability does not always mean a moral failing on the part of 
universities. Critiques of neo-liberalism have to recognize that collective 
attachments to numbers may reflect real tensions in the shifting purposes of higher 
education. While numbers do not necessarily produce well-formed ideas about 
education, there are many ideas about education that can only be promoted 
through the institutional force of measurement practices. Furthermore, given that 
neo-liberal economic thought is regularly criticized for being monolithic and 
reductive, it is important that ‘anti-neo-liberalism’ does not become equally 
monolithic. The institutional and political projects that conflict with neo-liberalism 
may themselves be extremely diverse. For this reason, scholarship on higher 
education is not always served well by the adoption of ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ stances in 
relation to metrics. The issue concerns the manner by which numbers come to take 
effect in organizational settings, and the extent to which effective numbers 
sediment as unassailable social facts. It is one thing to say that a given economic 
structure requires the minimal diffusion of a particular practical rationality. It is 
another thing to infer that a structure optimizes this rationality, as if each individual 
must repeat actions in the same way, to the same degree and to the same effect. 
We must therefore separate the concept of neo-liberal subjectivity, a position that 
may not necessarily be occupied by any single individual, from the dispositions 
adopted by those entrusted to comply with and administer neo-liberal metrics.  
 
This article has made no firm prescriptions concerning the desirability of 
measurement practices per se. The elongated data chain of measurements in 
education significantly exceeds the purview of any particular individual 
programme, school or university, and certain metrics perceived as socially 
deleterious (e.g., quantified research outputs) often coexist with metrics intended 
to produce better social outcomes (e.g., rates for participation along lines of 
gender, ethnicity, ability and so on). There is an inescapable gap between the 
numbers that carry instrumental value in the phenomenological life-worlds of 
practitioners, and numbers that seem to float away into the bureaucratic abyss, 
only to return – sometimes without warning – in annual reports, strategic planning 
days or grant application processes. Whatever their manner of arrival, the forces 
that allow new metrics to be instituted cannot be changed simply through 
denunciations of neo-liberalism. The introduction of bad numbers cannot be 
countered by an argument for no numbers unless strong alternative visions for 
organizational processes or educational purposes are offered. In this context, we 
have made some initial steps towards an engagement with the specific constraints 
that attend local measurements, and argued for a thicker account of organizational 
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